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Introduction
Anumber of current books deal with Operations Goodwood and Atlantic, but 
scant attention has been paid to the 6th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade and its three regiments, the 
Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada 
(CAM), the Fusiliers Mont-Royal (FMR) and the 
South Saskatchewan Regiment (SSR), and to the 
Essex Scottish Regiment which was attached to 
6th Brigade during this operation. When our role 
has been discussed at all, historians have inferred 
that the SSR fled or withdrew in panic in this 
action. My role was as Commander “B” Company 
of the SSR, and later as Acting Commanding 
Officer (A/CO) of the SSR during this operation. 
I wish to record my memories of the battle 
supplemented by historical documentation which 
I hope will cause historians to review the 6th 
Brigade action of 20 July 1944.
Before the Battle – 17-20 July 1944
On 17 July, our Commanding Officer (CO) Lieutenant-Colonel F.A. Clift held an Orders 
Group and presented a broad outline of the plan 
to the battalion. On 19 or 20 July, the 6th Brigade 
would take St. André-sur-Orne and Verrières 
with tanks in support in front of us, while 350 
guns of the artillery would fire in support as 
the Brigade went in. Lieutenant-Colonel Clift 
informed his officers that he had insisted to 
Brigade HQ (Headquarters) that armour support 
was essential. The outcome was that the SSR 
were to be supported by a squadron of tanks. 
To quote Lieutenant-Colonel F.A. Clift, “I had 
asked, and was granted, a tank squadron in 
direct support, because of the long assault, the 
rising ground at the objective, and the chances of 
a quick tank cum infantry attack by the enemy.”1  
In fact, the length of the assault to the SSR “D” 
Company objective, a track T junction, was 4,500 
yards or 4100 metres. By way of comparison, in 
our Regimental briefing on landing in France, we 
were told that one lesson of war was that attacks 
should be short, and no more than 1,000 yards 
in length.
On 18 July, our CO Lieutenant-Colonel Clift was 
called away temporarily to act as 4th Brigade 
Commander, and Major Reg Matthews acting 
commanding officer. 
On 19 July, Major Matthews held an Orders 
Group and issued the movement orders which 
would place us in position for the attack. Our 
battalion completed our move through the 
rubble into our concentration area in Caen by 
1500 hours on 19 July and departed from our 
position in the suburbs of Caen at 0200 hours 
20 July, arriving into the Assembly Area beside 
Ifs on its west side at 1130 hours. We dug in, “A” 
and “D” Companies forward of the road leading 
into Ifs, and “C” and “B” Companies in reserve 
behind the road.
At the Forming-Up-Place (FUP) Major Matthews 
went over the plans giving details of the artillery 
barrage and air cover.2  He informed us we would 
follow the original plan with the exception that 
there would be no tanks in direct support of us. 
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The only support we could count on was the 
indirect support of the Armour with the FMRs 
on our left flank and with the CAMs on our right 
flank. The reasoning given was that the enemy 
tank harbours at Rocquancourt and Fontenay-le-
Marmion had been bombed so that the expected 
counterattacks would be light and from infantry.3 
A map and overlay with our objectives on the high 
ground in map squares 0359 and 04594  had been 
provided to us. On the map, suspected enemy 
positions were indicated, but no accurately 
pinpointed positions. The intelligence was not up-
to-date. Further, we were not allowed to observe 
the terrain. That is, company commanders were 
not allowed to go forward to see the lay of the 
land. And no reconnaissance (recce) patrols were 
permitted to go out. 
Major Len Dickin, OC “D” Company, and I both 
questioned the A/CO regarding the lack of tank 
support and the suitability of the objective due to 
the high ground on our right flank from which we 
would be under enemy observation. Two features 
were Point 88 on our immediate right forward 
flank and Point 112 about 5 kilometres to the 
west across the Odon River on our right flank. 
It spelled danger to us. I asked if this action was 
a must? And Major Matthews the A/CO replied 
that yes it was an order.
While we waited in the FUP to launch the attack, 
the H-Hour or time of attack was delayed from 
1200 noon until 1500 hours.5  During this time 
Nebelwerfer or Moaning Minnies as we called 
them fell on our right flank, but fortunately there 
were no casualties.
The Plan
The plan called for a straightforward attack behind a creeping barrage. The barrage crept 
for 300 yards over 24 minutes, then lifted and 
skipped 300 yards and came down on the next 
300 yards in depth for 24 minutes before lifting 
and skipping the next 300 yards again and then 
coming down again. There were 5 lifts in all on 
our front creating six box barrages which are 
indicated on the accompanying map.6  
The battalion would advance behind the barrage 
with “A” Company on the left and “D” Company 
on the right, with “C” Company behind in reserve 
on the left and “B” on the right. Battalion HQ in 
the Command Post (CP) carrier advanced in the 
centre just behind the two forward companies. 
The line of advance once we reached Point 61 
was south along a former railway bed to the St. 
Martin-de-Fontenay / Verrières crossroad where 
we turned southeast to our objectives. The 
company objectives as per map references (MR) 
have been indicated on the accompanying map.7  
“A” Company Major Wells MR 048600 track 
crossroad
“B” Company Major Edmondson MR 039599
“C” Company Captain Doyle MR 042603
“D” Company Major Dickin MR 044594 track 
T junction
But it must be noted that during the operation 
itself, “B” Company and “D” Company objectives 
were traded by the A/CO, that is, “B” Company 
was given MR 044594 and “D” Company was 
given MR 039599 as an objective.
 In our radio messages back to 6th Brigade 
via the Battalion Command Post (CP), we were 
Captain John S. Edmondson photographed
in March 1943 during Exercise “Spartan.”
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to report “WOOD” when we reached intermediate 
objective Point 61, “FOREST” when we reached 
intermediate objective the St. André-sur-Orne/
Beauvoir Farm crossroad, and “POPLAR” when 
we reached our final objectives. 
 Our own Battalion supporting arms were the 
Battalion Mortar Platoon, Captain W.G.A. Lane 
OC, and the six 6-pounder anti-tank guns, Captain 
G.E. Colgate, OC. To this were added 17-pounder 
anti-tank guns from the “K” Troop, 23rd Battery, 
2nd Anti Tank Regiment.8  These supporting 
arms were on call to be brought forward when 
companies reached their objectives. In addition, 
an artillery Forward Observation Officer (FOO) 
was to move up to the Battalion objectives so he 
could call down artillery support when and where 
needed.
 Normally a FOO from the 6th Field Regiment 
who supported 6th Brigade would have been 
provided to us, but the fire programme was so 
extensive it involved all the field, medium and 
heavy guns of both the 2nd and 3rd Divisions and 
2nd, 3rd and 8th Army Groups Royal Artillery 
(AGRAs). So in this instance, the FOOs were 
pooled and assigned to units irrespective of their 
normal attachments so it not known today which 
FOO came forward.9  
 Typhoons were to provide air cover, but the 
rainstorm during the operation grounded the 
aircraft.
 The Essex Scottish from 4th Brigade was 
attached to the 6th Brigade for this operation. 
They were to form a firm base on the disused 
railway roadbed at the St. André-sur-Orne/ 
Beauvoir Farm crossroad Map Square 0361, 
with the expectation they would leapfrog forward 
later if the SSR established a firm base on their 
objectives. 
 The CAMs were to capture St. André-sur-
Orne on our right flank with the support of the 
tanks of “A” Squadron of the 27th Armoured 
Regiment (Sherbrooke Fusiliers), while the FMRs 
were to capture Beauvoir and Troteval farms and 
Verrières on our left flank supported by the tanks 
of “C” Squadron of the 27th Armoured Regiment. 
The tanks were not to move forward with the 
infantry, but were on call to come up and provide 
support when needed or to adopt positions from 
which to shoot the infantry onto their objectives. 
 The balance of the tanks or “B” Squadron 
were held in reserve in a position of observation 
at MR 023634 west of Ifs until ordered 200 
yards to the right behind “A” Squadron at 1800 
A Medium 5.5-inch gun of the Royal 
Canadian Artillery in action south of 
Caen.
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hours on the 20th to counter a reported enemy 
armoured threat. The 27th Regimental HQ tanks 
were located in the orchard on the west side of 
Ifs alongside the 6th Brigade HQ.10  
The Battle – 20 July 1944
Precisely at 1500 hours we crossed the start line directly behind artillery fire. Very shortly 
afterward “D” Company met the first enemy 
near Point 61 in a light encounter. A/Sergeant 
P.T. Maule of 18 Platoon “D” Company described 
to me what happened on the approach to Point 
61. He was advancing in line with his platoon 
when Lieutenant A. Frederickson who was in 
front began firing his rifle. Frederickson had 
just hit two enemies when there was a sudden 
burst of enemy machine gun (MG) fire from the 
wheat field in front of them. A/Sergeant Maule 
was left standing alone as the two men on his 
left and the two men on his right and Lieutenant 
Frederickson in front were struck down. He then 
told Corporal Bickerton to call for stretcher-
bearers for the five casualties.11  
A radio message from the SSR to Brigade at 
1505 hours stated “WOOD” which meant we had 
arrived at Point 61.12
At the St. André-sur-Orne crossroad, the 
opposition was more serious, approximately 
platoon strength. Radio message to Brigade at 
1602 hours: “S SASK R report FOREST area 
cleared.”
The opposition became heavier (company 
strength) at the St. Martin-de-Fontenay crossroad. 
Radio message to Brigade at 1707 hours: 
“Stubborn enemy pockets of resistance along 
axis. Mopping up continued.” 
Major Len Dickin, OC “D” Company, in his 
account of the attack described the advance to 
the objective as a series of small actions through 
the wheat fields – section commanders sending 
men forward with rifles, Stens or Brens to wipe 
out a slit trench. Many grenades were needed for 
fighting in such areas. 
At the St. Martin crossroad, Major Dickin 
reported to Major Matthews that he had lost 
two officers and 20 Other Ranks (ORs).13  And 
because “D” Company had growing casualties, 
Major Dickin requested to Major Matthews that 
he be relieved of his objective. Consequently 
Major Matthews in person ordered “B” Company 
to take over the “D” Company objective, and gave 
“B” Company objective to “D” Company. 
“B” Company finished helping “D” Company 
in our original role, that is, in mopping up the 
enemy slit trenches near the St. Martin crossroad 
to see they were clear of enemy, ensuring the 
POWs moved down the centre line to the rear 
and marking the spot where the wounded lay 
with rifle and helmet so the stretcher bearers 
could find them.
At 1732 hours, the SSR CP reported to Brigade 
that “D” Company had reached POPLAR, their 
altered objective.
Well before this message was sent, “B” Company 
had pushed through “D” Company at the double 
to catch up to our barrage and had turned 
southeast toward our new objective. Shortly 
thereafter “A” Company on our left encountered 
the first of many enemy posts. We halted and I 
moved my reserve platoon to fill up the space 
between “A” Company and ourselves to be certain 
we would not be fired on from the rear while this 
opposition was overcome.
We then pushed off again through artillery and 
mortar fire, dashing forward after the shells 
hit so that the next set of shells, which were 
creeping toward us, would miss us. At one set of 
slit trenches (MR 041597) we took 5 prisoners 
and at a second set further on, 10 prisoners 
(MR 044596).14  While mopping up one of these 
positions, we directed the Germans who had 
surrendered to go back down the centre line. 
I had just cleared one trench and was moving 
toward the next, when I glanced back and saw a 
German who had popped up from a trench about 
10 yards to my rear. He was raising his rifle to 
shoot me when Lieutenant Bob Pulley, who was 
coming up from behind, saw what was about to 
happen. He shot the German thus saving my life. 
All the while Germans who weren’t captured were 
running back through the grain.
It had already started to rain and soon opened 
up as a downpour. We continued and just before 
our own final barrage, which was to the south of 
our objective ceased at 1730 hours, Lieutenant 
Treleaven on our right stopped his platoon. I 
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demanded to know why? He pointed out that 
the Germans were dropping a line of shell fire 
like a stone being skipped on water behind our 
barrage and ahead of Treleaven’s platoon where 
the enemy expected us to be. In this position we 
were already on the forward slope and under 
observation from the high ground at Point 88 
and Point 112.
When we arrived at our objective, the two forward 
platoons were in a pea field on the forward slope. 
The tracks and T junction shown on the maps 
could not be located. For a moment I had the 
strong impulse to go and capture Point 88 about 
800 yards west of us. Sticking to the original 
orders, I ordered the men to commence digging 
in.
I turned toward my reserve platoon and saw that 
part of my Company HQ was moving toward the 
rear. I called to my Company Sergeant-Major 
who was supporting a man, and he held up his 
arm, which was dripping in blood. I motioned 
to them to continue moving back where they 
could seek medical help because there was no 
expectation that a wounded man stay and fight. 
It was then I noticed there were a large number, 
one to two dozen, of walking wounded who had 
been hit by shrapnel. They were heading back 
toward the crossroads in the direction of our 
Regimental Aid Post (RAP). At this moment the 
shelling on the objective was relatively light. More 
of it was falling at random behind us from where 
we had come. From this position I could see “D” 
Company positions behind us, but not “A” or “C” 
Company positions to our left where Battalion 
HQ had moved to because the ridge itself had 
crests or slight rolls in it.
Then I heard hollering from the platoon on my 
left – “tanks.” I saw four tanks one of which was 
a Panzer Mark IV. Another was reported as a 
haystack at MR 042592 just south of us.15  To use 
the colourful words in Dickin’s account: “Tanks 
appeared over my left front in “B” Company area 
shooting all hell out of everything in their path.” 
The tanks charged from our left rear continually 
firing High Explosive (HE) and machine gun 
directly at us as they moved in on us. All of this 
happened in less than a minute. No one had a 
chance to dig in more than a couple of spades full.
One tank came right into my left forward platoon 
driving right over top of people it didn’t shoot. I 
was hollering at the platoon sergeant when the 
tank fired a HE shell which struck him in the 
back. He disintegrated into pieces before my 
eyes. I hollered and used hand signals to order 
a withdrawal into the cover of the grain field in 
the direction of “D” Company behind which I 
expected to find the anti-tank screen. As I did so 
the muzzle of that tank gun turned on me. As the 
tracer fire started, I took a running dive out of 
the pea field and rolled into the wheat field and 
scrambled along on all fours as bullets skipped 
across my backside.
Once the men went to ground in the 3- to 4-foot-
high wheat, control was almost impossible 
because we could not see them or they us. Our 
span of control was limited to voice which could 
be heard only by those in the immediate vicinity. 
And casualties were diminishing the number of 
men capable of fighting. Captain Johnny Gates, 
my second in command, or myself screamed on 
the radio to Battalion HQ trying to get artillery 
support or anything, but we couldn’t get through. 
In fact we had no radio communications once 
the heavy rain set in. Captain George Lane, our 
Mortar Platoon officer, in his account of the action 
stated electrical storms hampered our 38 sets 
completely. Major Dickin noted that this wireless 
silence was due to the very sudden heavy rain 
which began about 1600 hours.16
I organized what defence I could in the wheat 
field while the others withdrew. The Bren guns 
were knocked out in the first five minutes. The 
PIAT (Projector Infantry Anti-Tank) ammunition 
carrier from 12 Platoon had been knocked out 
already. But I was able to leave the other two 
platoon commanders Lieutenants Pulley and 
Treleaven with their PIAT teams. One tank was 
stopped with two rounds and another tank hit 
without known results. Lieutenant Pulley never 
withdrew. Later in August he was found dead at 
this position. The tanks, once they had no easy 
targets, sprayed the wheat fields with machine 
gun fire and turned in circles through the wheat 
in an effort to crush the men or flush them into 
the open so they could be fired upon. Lieutenant 
Cas Treleaven lay in the field for an hour not more 
than 25 feet away from a tank before he was able 
to make his escape.17  
I ordered a withdrawal to the reverse slope 
behind “D” Company area and crawled back 
through the wheat with Captain Gates and 
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remnants of Company HQ and 12 Platoon. The 
other two platoons also crawled back through the 
wet wheat. Yet many more men were cut down 
during the withdrawal.
When we got behind “D” Company area, I found 
no one except a few wounded. “D” Company had 
already moved toward the rear. Since we had no 
communications with Battalion HQ, I ordered 
Captain Gates to hold there and to reform the 
Company in this area as men crawled their way 
through, while I went to find Battalion HQ.
As I passed over the crest south of the St. Martin-
de-Fontenay crossroad, I saw 17-pounder anti-
tank guns being knocked out. As the first was 
being towed into position, it was hit by enemy 
fire and was aflame before it even stopped. On 
stopping, the crew bailed out and they were all 
on fire. Besides artillery and mortar fire, German 
tanks were firing from the east.
As I continued to move north toward where 
I thought Battalion HQ might be, I found an 
artillery carrier just off the road, and roughly 
parallel to the “C” Company objective to the east 
of the road. The motor was still running and the 
wireless was on. I turned the dials and tried to 
make contact with the artillery in order to call 
down supporting fire. But I didn’t know their call 
signs, and there was no response.
Then I met our Signal Officer, Lieutenant B.A. 
Smith, and he informed me Battalion HQ had 
suffered a direct hit killing the A/CO Reg Matthews 
and the Intelligence Officer (IO) Lieutenant Doug 
Pedlow, and knocking out all communications. 
Lieutenant Smith told me all companies were 
withdrawing. He moved along the original axis of 
Canadian soldiers ready a 6-pounder anti-tank gun for action.
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56 This air photo shows Verrières Ridge to the southwest of Verrières village.  This is the area of “Poplar” - the 
objective of the South Saskatchewan Regiment during Operation “Atlantic,” and is also the location where 
the German armoured counterattack hit the Canadians. The openess of the terrain is evident from this 
image, as is the scarring of the battlefield due to shelling and the tracks of armoured vehicles. 
(WLU Air Photo Collection 59/3071)
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advance while I returned to “D” Company area 
to bring back Captain Gates and the riflemen 
with him. The A/CO and IO must have been 
killed shortly after their last radio message to 
Brigade at 1755 hours: “We are being attacked 
by tanks. We need help from the tank counter 
attack coming from the SOUTH.” Lieutenant 
Frank Mathers recorded Major Matthews last 
actions in his account: “Maj. Matthews had been 
wounded before he arrived at the CP (Command 
Post carrier) but nevertheless stayed right at his 
job taking no cover and doing his best to get arty 
(artillery) and tk sp (support).”18  
Once back over the crest I crawled most of the 
way back through the wet grain to find Captain 
Gates, only sticking my head up periodically to 
see where I was. It was miserable being soaked 
to the bone and muddy. Yet, if you stuck your 
head up too long, you would be shot at because 
the enemy were targeting any movement they saw. 
Enemy infantry weapons were firing from the 
southwest, and riflemen from the grain. When I 
arrived there, the slit trenches, which had been 
barely started, were just abandoned scrapes in 
the earth. I couldn’t find a sign of Captain Gates 
or the men with him. I assumed he and the men 
had sought cover elsewhere from the artillery 
and small arms fire. But a brief search failed 
to discover them. Later in August the bodies of 
Captain Gates and a few men were found in the 
green field not far away where they had sought 
shelter from the enemy fire. 
I then decided to go to Brigade HQ to seek artillery 
and armoured support. I made my way to the St. 
Martin-de-Fontenay crossroad where I got one 
of our carriers to Ifs. When we set off, I noticed 
small figures far down the slope in front of the 
St. André crossroads stand up and converge for 
a moment as if to consult and then double to the 
rear. Some of the forward elements of the Essex 
Scottish were withdrawing. To me they were in a 
precarious position and had to seek cover from 
the intense enemy fire.
On arriving at Ifs at about 1900 hours,19  I 
reported to the 6th Brigade Commander, 
Brigadier Hugh Young. I told him of the desperate 
situation, and that the A/CO was killed and 
communications cut, and that the area of our 
Battalion objective was now free for artillery 
fire. He said stop getting so excited. I said I’m 
just giving you the facts. Within minutes, Major 
Dickin arrived and repeated what I had just said 
about the situation and the A/CO. On determining 
that between Dickin and myself, I was the senior 
officer, the Brigade Commander said you’re now 
the A/CO and ordered me to reform the Battalion 
and hold them together on the reverse slope, but 
without any specific place being mentioned. The 
Brigade headquarters was in a state of confusion 
because they did not know what was going on. 
They seemed to change their mind from moment 
to moment. I could get no further direction 
other than what I have just mentioned. And the 
Brigade Commander offered no help to alleviate 
the immediate desperate situation. 
I proceeded to the St. André-sur-Orne crossroad 
where I found a few “B” Company men. There was 
no real possibility of digging in properly there 
under enemy fire, so I ordered them and the men 
from our other companies I could find to return 
and reform at the FUP. I stayed and supervised 
the removal of casualties by stretcher bearers 
and the carrier platoon. I directed Captain Lane, 
the platoon Mortar Officer, to remain and help 
the Essex. 
But the truth is with the breakdown in 
communications between Brigade, Battalion HQ 
and the companies, and with heavy casualties, 
the situation was chaotic. The walking wounded 
had streamed back or had been picked up by 
carrier. For the remainder, the action once the 
Battalion had been over run by tanks, was one 
of small or larger groups who had to act on their 
own initiative under the senior person present. 
Several attempts were made to mount a defence. 
The Mortar Officer, Captain Lane, testified that 
when our men passed by his position near 
the Essex Scottish at the St. André-sur-Orne 
crossroad, they came through in small groups, 
sometimes under NCOs and sometimes alone.20  
When I returned to the FUP I found a number 
of men already in position. As more men made 
their way in they were directed into their company 
groups. We dug in in our original company areas, 
then cleaned our weapons and replenished our 
ammunition. Food and hot tea were brought in. 
At 2030 hours there was one sergeant and 13 
ORs (Other Ranks) from “B” Company.
Men continued to come in during the night, 
some unscathed, some walking wounded and 
others who were wounded being carried back. 
9
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Lieutenant Henderson of “C” Company reported 
back at 2200 hours and said that fighting was 
still going on in front of the Essex Scottish and 
thought our chaps were fighting in front of and 
with the Essex Scottish.21  Some men had been 
pinned down for hours by the mere presence of 
tanks. Others had lain in the fields surrounded 
by enemy infantry until an opportunity to escape 
came. Everyone made their way back as best they 
could, considering they had to run the gauntlet 
of artillery, mortar, tank and machine gun and 
small arms fire. By 0800 hours the following 
morning, of about 95 men from “B” Company 
who went into the action, there was one officer, 
Lieutenant Treleaven, and 27 men present.22  The 
Battalion lost 13 officers and 209 ORs either 
killed, wounded or missing.23 
Because this is my personal account of the 
battle, rather than a regimental or battalion 
account, I will only provide brief highlights of 
what happened to the other three companies. 
In general they had much the same experience 
as “B” Company. They were over run by tanks. 
Moreover, the anti-tank guns called up in support 
were knocked out when they arrived.
Lieutenant S.M. Carter of “D” Company, which 
was in reserve behind us on the objective, testified 
they were attacked by about a half dozen tanks. 
He said our Battalion 6-pounder anti-guns were 
knocked out immediately. Lieutenant Carter then 
gave the order to withdraw, and “D” Company 
withdrew by stages back to the FUP.24  
Lieutenant Frank Mathers of “A” Company 
reported that on reaching the objective, the 
Company was subjected to heavy machine gun 
fire from trees on the south side of Verrières. 
Then four enemy tanks came in and knocked out 
four 6-pounder anti-guns and two 17 -pounders 
and the Battalion CP carrier before sniping at the 
infantry. The FOO who had come forward into 
this area left after A/CO Reg Matthews and the IO 
Lieutenant Doug Pedlow had been killed in the 
Command carrier. Major Wells OC “A” Company 
went over to 9 Platoon and never returned. (He 
was reported missing, and in August confirmed 
killed.) Then Lieutenant Mathers ordered his 8 
Platoon section leaders to withdraw. Of the 95 
men who went into the action, 34 were casualties 
- 2 killed, 7 missing, 25 in hospital.25  
A/Sgt. P.T. Maule of “D” Company described the situation at the St. André 
crossroads after his movement back from 
the objective. He, with the seven remaining 
men of 18 platoon, found 30 to 40 Essex 
men in the wheat field and north ditch of 
the St. André crossroad. He noticed that 
the deepest slit trenches they had managed 
to dig were about 18 inches deep. He had 
just asked the Essex sergeant with these 
men his plans, when at that moment heavy 
machine gun fire sprayed their position 
causing a number of casualties. Also red hot 
armour-piercing 88 mm shells passed over 
them, exploding in what appeared to him to 
be the rear area of our original FUP. Enemy 
tanks could be heard rumbling further south 
on the ridge. 
A/Sgt. Maule then in an effort to find more 
of his platoon went alone about 300 yards 
north along the main axis of the sunken 
roadway and came across 6-pounder guns 
on the road and in the adjacent field with all 
of the remaining crew dead. Finding none 
of his men, he decided to return to the St. 
André crossroads. As he crawled his way 
south on hands and knees, and on his 
stomach, while trying to keep his Sten gun 
clear of mud and ready for action, he saw 
German infantry advancing from the west 
along the St. André road. At the crossroads, 
he reported this to the Essex sergeant. 
As the fire had become extremely heavy, A/
Sgt. Maule and his men then sought refuge 
in the wheat field to the northeast where 
they had caught sight of men they thought 
might be “A” Company. On arriving there 
they found the men were from the Essex. 
As they were in a slight depression in the 
ground, they started to dig in. They stayed 
there through some heavy downpours of 
rain. 
After a time they decided to try to get back 
to the sunken road so they could make their 
way back to the FUP, but any movement 
in the grain brought small arms fire on 
them. He lay there with this small group 
of men, some of them wounded and with 
little ammo, through the night. Just before 
daylight, they moved further to the rear 
because 3-inch mortar, which was being 
fired from Ifs, was falling only two to three 
hundred yards south of them to their front. 
While moving north something struck him 
because he later woke up in hospital. He 
was told he had been found unconscious, 
suffering from concussion. He had 11 
stitches in the area of his right temple and 
returned to the SSR from hospital on 25 
July. He was initially reported missing in 
action, however, and his mother received 
this news by telegram.
Corporal Peter T.  Maule, 18 Platoon, 
“D” Company, South Saskatchewan 
Regiment, photographed after crossing 
the Seine River near Rouen, 31 August 
1944.  Corporal Maule was wounded 
in action three times – 21 July 1944, 
16 September 1944 & 13 December 
1944. (Source: P.T. Maule letter to John S. 
Edmondson, 14 March 1996)
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Company Sergeant-Major J.A. Smith of “C” 
Company, which was in reserve behind “A” 
Company, testified that at their objective they 
were counter attacked. Captain Doyle OC “C” 
Company gave the order for the company to 
withdraw. (Captain Doyle was reported missing 
and confirmed killed in August.) At 0200 hours 
on 21 July, CSM Smith had only Sergeant 
Cunningham and 28 ORs with him at the FUP.26  
Our Ant-Tank Platoon Officer, Captain Ted 
Colgate, reported the loss of all six 6-pounder 
guns, four carriers and 13 personnel. The 
attached “K” Troop, 23rd Battery 2nd Anti-Tank 
Regiment reported their four 17-pounder guns 
lost, and 7 personnel killed and some missing. 
The “some missing” as it turned out were 7 
personnel who were found to be in hospital on 
31 July. Before that date, the unit did not know 
if they were killed, in hospital or POWs.27  
On our Battalion right flank, the Camerons 
captured St. André-sur-Orne but had to fight off 
four counter attacks in the following day in order 
to hold on. The CAMs had the support of the 
27th Armoured Regiment “A” Squadron whose 
normal complement was reduced from 19 to 6 
tanks either destroyed or damaged by the end 
of 21 July.
On our Battalion left flank, the FMRs captured 
their intermediate objectives, the Beauvoir and 
Troteval Farms. “C” Squadron sent seven tanks 
from two troops to support them. Four of these 
tanks were destroyed or damaged with the 
balance withdrawing before nightfall. On the 
Three soldiers from the South Sasks examine a captured German “Schwimmwagen” amphibious scout car at 
Rocquancourt on 11 August 1944. From left to right: Private T. Schwartz, Major John Edmondson and Captain Neville 
Hadley. Captain Hadley was killed in action on 28 August 1944.
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morning of 21 July, “C” Squadron had only six 
tanks remaining, three from the attack on 20 
July and their three HQ tanks. In regard to the 
infantry, the two forward companies of the FMRs 
who attempted to move on to the final objective of 
Verrières were cut off by the enemy from behind 
and entirely overcome. Only a few got back to our 
own lines. The two reserve companies held onto 
Beauvoir and Troteval farms as long as possible 
but were finally compelled to withdraw by enemy 
counterattacks. 
After the Battle – 21-25 July 1944
On 21 July, we stayed in position at the FUP until about noon while artillery and 
mortar fell on our positions and the surrounding 
area. Then we were ordered to withdraw to an 
area north of Fleury-sur-Orne where we were 
picked up by TCVs (Troop Carrying Vehicles) 
and taken to la Villeneuve just west of Carpiquet.
On the 22nd, we took a roll call to verify who was 
present and who to the best of our knowledge 
were killed or missing. In addition, we took 
a weapons count. I spoke to the men of “B” 
Company. I reviewed the battle with them, and 
assured them we had nothing to be ashamed of. 
I said given that we were unable to obtain either 
artillery or tank support, they had done their 
best under the circumstances. The men had a 
good grasp of the events and were subdued yet 
in relatively good spirits considering what had 
happened, showing no signs of undue combat 
stress.
In the morning, reinforcements started to arrive, 
and the LOB (left out of battle) personnel joined 
us. Major Pat Adams who was the senior officer 
then became A/CO while I became second-in-
command of the Battalion while at the same time 
Major Adams expected me in the confusion of 
reorganization to continue to fill the role as OC 
“B” Company.
Major-General Charles Foulkes, GOC 2 Division, 
visited the Battalion. Because I had become A/CO 
during the operation he spoke with me. He was 
clearly unhappy with the results of the operation. 
Officers from the South Saskatchewan Regiment photographed in May or June
1944 at Broome Park, England (north of Dover) just prior to the invasion.
“A” Company
Front row, left to right: Major R.S. “Bob” Wells [WIA 19 
August 1942; KIA 20 July 1944], Captain W.S. “Bill” 
Edmondson (John’s brother) [LOB 20 July 1944; WIA 8 
August 1944]; Back row: ?, Lieutenant Frank Mathers [WIA 
27 July 1944], Lieutenant James F. McGeough [WIA 20 
July 1944; WIA 20 December 1944].
“B” Company
Front row, left to right: Captain John L. Gates [KIA 20 July 
1944], Major John S. Edmondson [WIA 19 August 1942; 
WIA 17 August 1944]; Back row: Lieutenant R.J. “Bob” 
Pulley [KIA 20 July 1944], Lieutenant D.C. “Cas” Treleaven 
[WIA 20 July 1944].
(WIA - wounded in action; KIA - killed in action; LOB - left out of battle)
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He said who gave you the authority to withdraw? 
Why didn’t you stay and dig in on your objective? 
Why have you lost all of your automatic weapons 
and other equipment? I received quite a grilling, 
and General Foulkes’ tone was very accusatory. 
I simply replied that we were caught in an open 
field the moment we arrived at the objective. 
Enemy tanks came in and rolled right over top 
of my men. There was no time to dig in. Within 
minutes our automatic weapons were knocked 
out and we had no communications of any kind. 
There was no tank support, no artillery support 
and what anti-tank guns we had were knocked 
out behind us. With the tanks running over top 
of my men, I had but one duty left, to save as 
many lives as possible. That was why I ordered 
them to withdraw into the wheat field. He had no 
answer to my response. But he obviously was not 
satisfied because he ordered a Court of Enquiry 
in the Field to report on the losses of weapons 
and equipment by the SSR and Essex Scottish.
The other SSR Company Commanders had also 
given orders to withdraw. From my personal 
knowledge of events, I can state Major Dickin 
and Major Wells did. The records of the Court 
of Enquiry in the Field of 2 August 1944 show 
that Captain Doyle did also, and confirms what 
I know about Major Wells.28  
On 23 July, the Battalion received replacement 
vehicles and other equipment. Major Adams 
issued a warning order to be prepared to move 
to our former positions beside Ifs by 1800 hours. 
The reorganization and re-equipment of the 
Battalion had its moments of confusion and poor 
coordination. The TCVs we were to climb into for 
the move were ready when the vehicles delivering 
our new Bren guns and PIATs arrived alongside. 
So we had to break open the crates and issue the 
weapons directly to the platoons before climbing 
aboard. The weapons were not even degreased 
and fired to make them ready for action. And at 
this point we climbed into the TCVs and went.
During the move the convoy got split up. The 
rear section, I was in, was halted by a British 
sentry as we approached the British zone in Caen. 
Sergeant T. Harrison and men of the South Saskatchewan 
Regiment riding in a Bren carrier lead German prisoners 
into captivity, 8 August 1944.
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On ascertaining the problem, I had the convoy 
rerouted and led them to the FUP at Ifs. The lead 
section had arrived at 0300 hours on the 24th, 
but the rear section arrived just before first light. 
We drove in right along the road leading into Ifs 
on its west side and in full view of the enemy 
as first light was dawning. We dug into our old 
positions temporarily. After a recce was made, 
the Battalion dug into positions in front of Ifs 
ensuring that each slit trench had a roof because 
of the periodic and frequent artillery and mortar 
shelling of our positions. The Battalion was back 
in the line.
I gave the order that as soon as the slit trenches 
were dug, all rifles and automatic weapons were 
to be cleaned and fired to ensure they were ready 
for action. We were all firing when the A/CO 
Pat Adams or his Adjutant came on the phone 
and said stop that firing. I refused, saying I’m 
responsible for “B” Company and I’m supposed 
to be ready for operations. Firing continued 
and then Major Adams got on the phone and 
hollered, come over to Battalion HQ, I want to 
talk to you. When I got to Battalion HQ, I found 
them cowering in their slit trenches, and I tried 
to find out from the IO what on Earth was going 
on? Just then Brigadier Hugh Young, GOC 6th 
Brigade, arrived, and Major Adams went over, 
saluted and asked the Brigadier to relieve him 
of his command. Brigadier Young called him the 
worst names I have heard a man called in all my 
life. He then turned to me and said, you’re in 
command, carry on. 
On the following day, 25 July,29  Major Adams 
reported to hospital and in the evening Lieutenant-
Colonel Clift returned to resume command of 
the SSR. To me the situation in Battalion HQ 
illustrated that sometimes the fear of what you 
haven’t experienced is worse than the fear of 
what you have had to face. In other words the 
fear that gripped some of the men who were 
LOB was worse than the fear of those who had 
been in combat. I was as scared as anyone. Yet 
as a professional soldier, it is your job to get on 
in any case.
Later Post-Battle Events
On 9 August 1944, the day after the capture of Rocquancourt by the SSR as part of 
Operation Totalize, I became A/CO again while 
Lieutenant-Colonel Clift went to hospital to have 
a piece of shrapnel removed from his back. I 
went out with Captain Neville Hadley, our IO, to 
survey the battlefield of 20 July. It was a grim 
task because there were pieces of people and 
bloated bodies with blackened skin. Nevertheless 
I remember I was able to identify Bob Pulley 
by the shape of his forehead and clothing. We 
marked the positions and identified the bodies 
we could in preparation for the burial parties 
who were to go out the next day to complete the 
task. Among those we identified were Major Reg 
Matthews, Major Bob Wells, Captain Charlie 
Doyle, Captain John Gates, Lieutenant Doug 
Pedlow and Lieutenant C.D. “Sonny” Grayson.30 
At the same time, just to the west of where we 
fought, we found a wave of the Black Watch whose 
bodies, wireless and weapons were all piled up 
there on the ground where they had fallen on 25 
Three members of the South Sasks look at the bombed 
Church in Rocquancourt.  The church tower was used 
by German snipers during the South Sask capture of the 
town. The man standing at the left is believed to be John 
Edmondson.
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July. In the past weeks, when the wind blew the 
wrong way, the stench of death over our positions 
was nauseating. Flies on the front lines multiplied 
by the millions, and food contamination caused 
dysentery among the men. You could not shoo 
the flies fast enough to keep them off your food.
During the morning of the 10th of August, both 
Brigadier Young and General Foulkes came to our 
Battalion CP. Brigadier Young came to warn us of 
our next move and General Foukles to ascertain 
the current situation there on our front.31 
During my conversation with General Foulkes, I 
said to him, you asked me all those embarrassing 
questions a couple of weeks back. I invite you to 
go with me to take a look at the battlefield. You 
will find all the bodies still lying there unburied 
along with their weapons. He declined to go. Yet 
the proof was there; the weapons, which had 
been deemed an excessive loss by the Court of 
Enquiry, still lay there.
The Question of Panicking, Breaking, 
Scattering, Fleeing, Retreating in a 
Disorganized manner after Throwing 
Away Weapons
Anumber of historians infer the SSR and Essex Scottish either panicked, broke, 
scattered, fled or retreated or threw away their 
weapons in the face of enemy opposition. An 
example of this is contained in David Bercuson’s 
Maple Leaf Against the Axis: Canada’s Second 
World War: “In danger of being encircled and 
losing men by the minute, the Canadian troops 
in the centre broke; they threw away their 
weapons and ran back, chased by the advancing 
Germans.”32
Did the SSR and Essex panic, break, flee, scatter 
or retreat in a disorganized manner, and throw 
away their weapons? In my mind, there are two 
elements to be considered here. The first is the 
wounded, and second is the men who were still 
fit for action.
There is no doubt that many of the wounded who 
streamed back, the walking wounded and those 
who were carried back in relays by carrier or 
jeep, were in a state of fright or shock. George G. 
Blackburn in his book The Guns of Normandy 
records one SSR who yelled to the Essex: “It’s 
bloody suicide to go up there.”33  But I wish to 
point out that this was the wounded. To me the 
stream of wounded seems to have coloured the 
views of those who witnessed this procession of 
injured soldiers. These witnesses have influenced 
some historians to interpret the stream of 
wounded as a general South Saskatchewan 
Regiment retreat or flight. However, the action 
accounts of the South Sask officers and testimony 
at the Court of Inquiry on 2 August 1944, which 
have been largerly overlooked, paint a different 
picture.
It is evident that because we had no radio 
communications to Brigade or internally within 
the Battalion, the command and control structure 
of the SSR was broken. But that is different 
from breaking and running. I agree we were 
disorganized in that the Battalion was unable to 
act any longer in a coordinated manner or as a 
whole. Lieutenant Carter stated at the Court of 
Enquiry:
It was not an orderly withdrawal.…We 
endeavoured to organize it without success.…
We withdrew by stages back to the FUP.34 
Despite the inability to organize the withdrawal 
under fire, the withdrawal was still by stages. 
This is not the action of fleeing soldiers.
 Lieutenant Carter further testified that in the 
first stage of withdrawal: “Our own 6 pdr guns 
moved in but were knocked out immediately. 
I then moved the remainder of “D” Company 
around the A/Tk guns to try and help them get 
into action but met with no success owing to the 
guns drawing all the German fire.”
 Captain Clifford Smith was OC Support 
Company during the attack. It was his job 
while located just to the south of the St. Martin 
crossroads to direct the anti-tank guns into the 
company areas they were allotted to support. He 
had this to say about the reason and manner of 
SSR withdrawal:
The regiment moved back after taking the 
objective for one reason, that they would have 
been annihilated to do otherwise.
The companies were unable to withdraw by 
the usual fire and movement since they had 
no effective fire plan available to them. The 
companies therefore infiltrated, using available 
15
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cover and arrived back at the ridge in varying 
sized groups and compositions. Baker and 
Charlie Companies arrived and soon organized 
a defence on the north side of the ridge. Capt. 
Smith (author) remained atop the ridge and 
directed troops to the new defence positions 
during the withdrawal, our forces remained 
generally calm and disciplined.35
 I will reiterate here that in the final analysis, 
once our anti-tank guns were knocked out, 
we had only the infantry weapons we carried 
with us, while the enemy was able to employ 
infantry, mortar, artillery and tank guns in their 
counterattack. What effective fire plan could we 
mount! But nonetheless, attempts at a defence 
were mounted. Examples follow.
 Captain Alex Matheson, OC Carrier Platoon, 
said in his account of the action written on 23 
July 44 that,
Just south of the second x rds [St. Martin] 
they found the road blocked. MMGs were firing 
from both the right and left flanks by the time 
we moved fwd (forward), and one pl (platoon) 
of “D” Company was moving backwards across 
the road. In a few mins Maj. Dickin came up 
and ordered us to go just north of the x rds and 
to stay there. He then went to the Brigade comd 
and I organized “D” Company in the area until 
he returned.
 Major Dickin related that in his withdrawal “I 
planned to take them back to an area with some 
dead ground in it and dig in there. The area I 
planned to use was the area NW of the X rds 0360 
[St. Martin], but it proved unsuitable as there 
was no cover. I then planned to retire behind the 
guns of the Essex Scottish. I went personally to 
the comd of the Essex Scottish so as to be sure 
he knew the posn (position). I found our 3 in. 
mortar pl there.”
 Capt. Murray Stewart recorded that “A 
general movement of withdrawal took place to 
the area of the St. André-sur-Orne—Troteval X 
rds took place and the bn was to dig in on that 
as they could not withstand the armour on their 
objective. The plan was that the Essex would 
hold the reverse slope of the objective directly 
to our south while we dug in at the res (reserve) 
posn. This was not successful as the Essex also 
got shot up and began to pull back.”
 In respect to “B” Company, prior to the 
withdrawal behind the “D” Company area, I 
had ensured that on the objective “All PIATs 
remained under their crews and in two cases 
platoon commanders were left to deal with the 
tanks.” I then left Capt. Gates to consolidate “B” 
Company behind the “D” Company area while I 
attempted to find Battalion HQ. When I returned 
to the place where I had left Capt. Gates to reform 
the Company, I found no one and that “The area 
where my Company should have been was under 
fire from riflemen in the grain.” Then I went to 
Brigade to obtain artillery or tank support but to 
no avail. Then I found that “When I returned, my 
Company had moved back to the Essex Scottish 
front, I could not see the other Companys. ... I 
stopped the mortar offr and told him to remain 
to help the Essex when they got to this X rds.”
 The Mortar Officer, Captain George Lane, in 
his account stated that “OC “B” Company passed 
by and told us to set up our plates which we did 
just behind a crest…300 yds north of the [St. 
André] rd junc. I went to Col Macdonald of the 
Essex Scottish to see if we should fire. He did 
not know either what the situation of our fwd 
tps (troops) was; only a few of our own tps had 
come back and we felt there must be more fwd. 
We could not fire because we did not know the 
posn of our fwd tps.…When the tk alarm was on, 
Capt. Colgate took one of my PIATs to protect our 
left. He helped the Essex put in their 6 pdr as all 
his own were knocked out.”36
 What this evidence illustrates is that even with 
no central command or control of the Battalion, 
the different groups at different times on their 
own initiative attempted to organize a defence. 
We were not fleeing or running away from the 
enemy. We withdrew to what we hoped were 
more favourable positions for defence. And we 
were not retreating either in my mind, because 
the connotation in retreat is to draw back from 
a superior force following or during a defeat. 
Although we were taking a horrendous beating, 
we had not conceded defeat, or we would not 
have attempted a defence in the face of superior 
firepower.
 My view of what happened then is that the 
SSR were compelled to withdraw in a manner 
dictated by the circumstances of superior enemy 
firepower, and that we continued to mount our 
defence and fight as the conditions permitted. I 
consider the notion that we panicked, fled or ran, 
a misrepresentation of our actions, and a notion 
which I hope I have put to rest.
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Conclusion
To conclude, given the deeply flawed plan devised by Higher Command, the battle of 
the 20th of July should never have been fought 
by the SSR or Essex Scottish. That it was fought 
made us the pawns of war.
 I hope by this account and study to give 
historians pause for thought. It is my view 
that historians should not always depend on 
the opinions of Brigade, Division or even Corp 
Commanders who sometimes wrote reports or 
wrote memoirs to disguise their own lack of 
judgment in action, of which Operation Atlantic 
is a good example. The tendency has been for the 
blame to be shifted downward to the Battalion 
level: they broke, they fled, they scattered in the 
face of the enemy due to some tactical error or 
lack of control at their level. In the cases of failed 
actions, not enough attention seems to be given 
to the reports of Battalion officers, who often well 
understood the flaws in tactical plans and orders 
from Higher Command that they were expected 
to carry out. The quality of leadership given 
by Higher Command needs to be as carefully 
scrutinized as the actions of those charged with 
carrying out their orders. In the case of 6th 
Brigade and Operation Atlantic, I don’t feel this 
has been properly done, and it has been one of 
the reasons for undertaking this study.
Personnel of the South Saskatchewan Regiment relax in Rocquancourt, 11 August 1944.
Left to right: Lance Corporal M.H. Krushelinski, Private J.A. Balogh and Lance Corporal P. Kotyk.
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 Note: This personal account of the South Saskatchewan 
Regiment is an extract from a larger study of the battle of 20 
July 1944.
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 My gratitude is also due to Dr. C. Christie who kindly 
provided photocopies of maps of France and to Col. J.S. 
Labbé, Commandant, and Serge Campion, Chief Librarian, 
of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College 
in Kingston who provided copies of the accounts of South 
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John S. Edmondson was born in Estevan, 
Saskatchewan in 1919. He joined the 
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry 
Regiment in 1938, and then served with the 
South Saskatchewan Regiment during World 
War II in the Defence of England, on the 
Dieppe Raid and in the Normandy Campaign 
until wounded during the capture of Falaise. 
After the war, he was transferred to the Black 
Watch (RHR) Regiment of Canada. He served 
in Canada in many roles, and as an exchange 
officer with the British 4th Division in West 
Germany as part of NATO. In addition, he 
served with the U.N. Military Observer Group 
in Kashmir, India and Pakistan. He served 
until reaching the mandatory retirement age 
in 1971. John, with the assistance of his son 
Doug, wrote this account in 2003.
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